

time, the Department itself is not too well informed as to the local situation, particularly with regard to the status of current outlying island development, thus making it even more necessary that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be guided by broad policy and objectives rather than by categorical instructions.

It is suggested that it be made a cardinal principle that the Commander-in-Chief, Pacific Fleet be immediately informed of all (12) important developments as they occur and by the quickest secure means available.

VIII. PUBLIC OPINION.

(a) As preparation for war, the current mental and moral preparation of our people, as reflected in the newspapers and magazines, is utterly wrong. To back into a war, unsupported or only half-heartedly supported by public opinion, is to court losing it. A left-handed, vacillating approach to a very serious decision is totally destructive of that determination and firmness of national character without which we cannot succeed. The situation demands that our people be fully informed of the issues involved, the means necessary and available, and the consequences of success or failure. When we go in, we must go with ships, planes, guns, men and material, to the full extent of our resources. To tell our people anything else is to perpetrate a base deception which can only be reflected in tactical and half-hearted prosecution.

H. R. Korman.

EXHIBIT No. 34

Our 7971

Via Clipper Mon 28 July

Cincpac File No.

UNITED STATES PACIFIC FLEET

U. S. S. PENNSYLVANIA, flagship

PEARL HARBOR, T. H., July 26, 1941.

Secret

DEAR BETTY:—When the proposed visit of the Under Secretary was announced my staff prepared a list of topics which might be of interest for discussion while Mr. Forrestal and his party are here. Not know the purpose of Mr. Forrestal's visit or whether he is informed concerning the general nature of our war plans and our problems I decided it better to combine these notes into a letter to you and believe quicker action can be obtained in that way. Following are the principal items of which I have been think:—

(1) The importance of keeping the Commander-in-Chief advised of Department policies and decisions and the changes in policies and decisions to meet changes in the international situation.

(a) We have as yet received no official information as to the U. S. attitude towards Russian participation in the war, particularly as to the degree of co-operation, if any, in the Pacific, between the U. S. and Russia if and when we become active participants. Present plans do not include Russia and do not provide for coordinated action, joint use of bases, joint communication systems and the like. The new situation opens up possibilities for us which should be fully explored and full advantage taken of any opportunities for mutual support. Pertinent questions are:—

(1) Will England declare war on Japan if Japanese attack Maritime Provinces?

(2) If answer to (1) is in the affirmative, will we actively assist, as tentatively provided in case of attack on N. E. I. or Singapore?

(3) If answer to (2) is in the affirmative, are plans being prepared for joint action, mutual support, etc.?

(4) If answer to (1) is negative, what will England's attitude be? What will ours be?

(5) If England declares war on Japan, but we do not, what is attitude in regard Japanese shipping, patrol of Pacific waters, commerce raiders, etc.?

(b) Depending upon the progress of hostilities, the Russian situation appears to offer an opportunity for the strengthening of our Far Eastern defenses, particularly Guam and the Philippines. Certainly, no matter how the fighting goes, Japan's attention will be partially diverted from the China and Southern adventures by either (1) diversion of forces for attack on Russia or (2) ne-

cessity for providing for Russian attack on her. It is conceivable that the greater the German success on the Eastern front, the more Russia will be pushed toward Asia, with consequent increased danger to Japan's "New Order" for that area. In my opinion we should push our development of Guam and accelerate our bolstering of the Philippines. The Russo-Axis war may give us more time.

(2) Priorities in connection with preparation for a Pacific war:—

(a) *Transports and Light Destroyer Transports.*—During the Commander-in-Chief's visit to Washington, all the transports, including the light destroyer transports, were transferred to the Atlantic. The necessity for this is recognised. Nevertheless, we still need transports in the Pacific and the need is even greater now (in point of view of time particularly) because most of our trained marines went with the transports and we are faced with an immediate training problem in addition to a possible war situation. The Department has initiated action to complete the HARRIS and ZEILIN and to acquire and convert four more transports for the Pacific, but, so far as is known, has done nothing about replacing the light destroyer transports (APD's). These vessels were originally conceived and developed for a Pacific campaign. They are especially suitable for use in attacks on atolls and may be the only means of readily attacking those positions. While by no means discounting their usefulness in the Atlantic, the need for them in the Pacific is paramount. It at all possible, they should be returned to this ocean *at once*. If this cannot be done, and only if it cannot be done, additional destroyers must be converted as soon as possible. Work on the large transports must also be expedited and completion dates anticipated if possible.

(b) *Marine Equipment.*—The Sixth Defense Battalion does not now have its full equipment particularly AA guns and .30 and .50 caliber machine guns. The remaining units of the Second Marine Division were stripped of much of their equipment to fit out the reenforced regiment that went East. There is practically no marine ammunition now on the West Coast. It is practically certain that these units will fight before the Army will and their needs must be given priority. We can't fight an amphibious war in the Pacific without ammunition for the marines.

We are going ahead with the preparation of a camp in Oahu for five thousand marines. When they come they should be fully equipped for amphibious warfare. The transports etc., should be ready at the same time. An estimate of when the needed equipment and men will be available would help us in our planning.

(c) *Ammunition Facilities.*—The condition of ammunition handling and storage facilities ashore are in general satisfactory at the present time. Storage facilities have been completed, are in the process of construction, or are about to be started to handle assignments of service reserves of gun ammunition, bombs, mines, and torpedoes. This includes igloos already completed and others now under construction at Westloch and at Lualualei.

New construction authorized and about to be undertaken includes four powder magazines and four shell houses at Lualualei, and barricaded stowage for live mines, two new mine anchor buildings and a new mine assembly building at Westloch.

New construction needed to complete stowage and handling facilities includes extension of Westloch dock to a maximum of two thousand feet and the construction of four powder magazines and two shell houses at Westloch to accommodate target practice ammunition which cannot be stowed in vessels of the Fleet. This latter construction has been recommended to the Commandant of the Fourteenth Naval District in recent correspondence and we have no word yet on what action he has taken.

(d) The importance of building up Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor to the point contemplated by the Greenslade Board. For the present Navy Yard, Pearl Harbor should be regarded primarily as a "restricted availability" yard. Overhaul of ships here should not include battleships and cruisers or other ships for extensive regular overhauls. The facilities of the yard should be confined to emergency and low priority overhaul, regardless of overhead costs.

(e) Provide more and more personnel to the Fleet for training. The personnel situation has been presented to the Bureau of Navigation and that Bureau is thoroughly familiar with our requirements. We cannot provide experienced personnel for new construction next year unless we obtain recruits and train them intensively at once. I realize that recruiting has fallen

off and that the Department is doing all it can but we are losing trained men faster than we are getting new recruits. As I stated in a recent letter we could use 20,000 more men in the Pacific Fleet right now.

(f) Need for a hospital ship in the Pacific Fleet and for completion of new hospital at Pearl Harbor.

(g) Urgency for small craft in the Fourteenth Naval District for patrol purposes, to relieve the load on our limited number of destroyers.

(h) The need for acquiring advanced base material and assembling it at Mare Island.

(i) Correspondence has gone forward urging that all available light craft in the Pacific be fitted with depth charges, listening gear, etc. This is important.

(3) *Communications*.—The supply of communication, radio, and sound equipment to the Fleet and the Shore Stations leaves much to be desired, although a great improvement has been noted in the last year.

(a) Specifically it is noted that the Kaneohe Air Station was acquired, built, commissioned, and actually operated prior to the receipt of any radio apparatus, except some which we diverted from its intended advance base use.

(b) It took BuEng two years to put "Chinese copies" of NRL's Radar on six ships.

(c) For years BuEng prevented research by NRL in any form of radio recognition device and hence retarded the production of such apparatus. The Fleet is still without it though it is under manufacture.

(d) We must have the IFF (Identification, Friend or Foe) for aircraft at once. The program lags and on June 14th only 56 were on order from Canada with indefinite delivery date. See "Aviation" below.

(e) Radar equipment for submarines is highly important. I am not informed as to exact status of this but understand development is not entirely satisfactory. There is evidence that German subs are equipped with Radar.

In general, Naval shipboard radio and sound equipment is so elaborate that it cannot be manufactured expeditiously. BuEng should have type plans for apparatus of such a nature that they can get results from industry and not make each new piece of apparatus a research job.

(4) *Aviation Requirements*.—These items, all of which have recently been taken up with the Department, are summarized briefly:—

(a) *Pre-Fleet Training*. Two units under the Fleet at San Diego, one for patrol squadrons and one for carrier squadrons. More pilots for battleships and cruisers, for training on board ship. Particular emphasis on double complements for patrol squadrons; anticipation of enlisted personnel numbers and training in all categories, particularly patrol squadrons; building up the supply of spare airplanes; accomplishing the training without any further drain on combat readiness of active squadrons.

(b) *New Torpedo Planes*.—Highest priority—A-1-a—instead of present priority which is A-1-b. There are only half enough torpedo planes now and they are obsolescent, while war reports demonstrate that there may be no single item of greater naval importance.

(c) *Conversions for Carrier Landing Training*.—Auxiliary aircraft carrier conversion was dropped because of time and cost factors. These can be greatly reduced by requiring only the characteristics needed for landing training. The need for these ships is extreme. Aircraft carriers should not, and in war cannot, be used for this purpose, while new pilots *must* be properly trained before joining active squadrons if combat readiness is not to be jeopardized.

(d) *A. S. V. (Anti-Surface Vessel) Equipment*.—This is of the highest potential value. Apparently none will be available for patrol planes until December. It can be carried by other planes, as shown by reports of British torpedo plane operations. It should be provided for every plane that can carry it and much earlier deliveries are essential.

(e) *I. F. F. (Identification, Friend or Foe) Equipment*.—This is absolutely complementary to and essential for effective use of the Radar for aircraft defense of the Fleet. Without it, the Radar cannot differentiate between friendly and enemy airplanes. There is no definite information on deliveries. No delay whatever is acceptable.

(f) *Engines for New Patrol Planes (PBY-5's)*. Nose section failures have been occurring. Every effort is being made to find and cure the trouble. This should be continued, for it will be no help to the Fleet or to any destination of these planes to get new planes that can't fly in place of older planes that can.

(g) *Landplane Field at Johnston Island*. This was removed from the project by the Department. It should be put back. It is needed not only as an adjunct to

local defense but, more importantly, as an aid to defense against expeditions headed eastward and as a stepping stone for landplane support of expeditions headed westward.

(h) *Kechi Lagoon Development.* This will be of very great value to patrol planes in the Hawaiian area. It is the best location for operations of these planes and no other place is suitable for planned patrol plane expansion in this area. Inclusion of facilities for Navy patrol squadrons in this development should be undertaken immediately.

(i) *Development of the N.A.S. Barber's Point.* This approved development is very urgently needed. There is a strong tendency to turn down many aviation shore facility items in this area on the basis that they will be available when Barber's Point construction is finished. This makes it more than ever mandatory to expedite the work.

My kindest regards and best wishes always.

Most sincerely yours,

H. E. KIMMEL.

Admiral H. R. STARK, *U. S. Navy,*
Chief of Naval Operations,
Navy Department, Washington, D. C.

MESSAGE No 35

SECRET

WHS/sajf

NAVY DEPARTMENT,
 OFFICE OF THE CHIEF OF NAVAL OPERATIONS,
 WASHINGTON, August 21, 1941.

DEAR KIMMEL: When I left I asked Ingram to reply to your letter. The enclosed draft I have just inherited. In order to get it off to you in this next clipper, I am sending it along as it, except for some pencil notes (both red and black) which I have just added.

I know you want results, not excuses. So do I. I am doing everything from pleading to cussing with all the in between variations and hope the picture presented is not too unsatisfactory.

I realize that in addition to this letter I have two more of yours to answer which I shall try to get at the first of the week. If I can clear up urgent, current material now on my desk. Still sending into the pile I found on my return.

There is much doing in the Atlantic and in the formative stage. Thank God we should have things in full swing before long and with plans fairly complete. [Handwritten comment: It has changed so many times—but now I think we at last have something fairly definite may-be.]

To your own situation I am giving every thought I know how. You may rest assured that just as soon as I get anything of definite interest, I shall fire it along.

My best to your fine District Mate, (Admiral Bloch) and to all with you, and as always—

Best of luck— with you were close by

Sincerely,

BETTY.

Admiral HERMAN R. KIMMEL, *U. S. N.*
USS PENNSYLVANIA, Flagship
Pearl Harbor, T. H.

[11]

NAVY

AUGUST 19, 1941.

DEAR MARGARET: Your letter of 26 July 1941 arrived in the Navy Department on the eve of my departure for distant parts. It was fine to hear from you, and I appreciate your laying before me so frankly the thoughts that are going through your mind.

My reply to you has been delayed for two reasons:

1. There was insufficient time between the receipt of your letter and my departure to prepare a reply, and

2. So many of the points you raised I had hoped to have the answers upon my return to the Navy Department.